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  Abstract 
 
  The scientific mechanism for the development of antibiotic resistance in microbes has 
long been understood, and has long cautioned against the use of low doses of antibiotics 
insufficient to treat disease thoroughly.  Despite this, low doses of antibiotics have, for nearly 
half a century, been given to food animals to promote faster growth and greater feed efficiency.  
Though this raises public health concerns, a complex political landscape has historically 
prevented these public health concerns from dominating regulatory policy, and continues to do 
so.  This paper examines the scientific, political, and legal issues associated with the use of 
antibiotics in animal agriculture, with particular focus on FDA’s historical and evolving role in 
regulating this issue, and concludes briefly with speculation about the future of this issue. 
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I.  Introduction 
  Since the mid-twentieth century, antibiotic drugs have been used to promote growth in 
meat-producing animals.  For just as long, it has been understood that repeated use of antibiotic 
drugs will eventually lead to a decrease in efficacy of those drugs, as natural selection leads to 
more and more microbes that are resistant to the antibiotics.  From a public health perspective, 
one must balance the present public health benefits of the use of antibiotics against the future 
public health consequences of resistance to those antibiotics. 
  In the context of animal agriculture, however, the consensus has long been that there are 
no benefits to public health of the use of antibiotics in low, constant doses (sometimes called 
“sub-therapeutic” or “non-therapeutic” use) to promote growth.  Instead, it has been 
acknowledged that the only known benefit to such use is economic: that increasing feed 
efficiency and decreasing the amount of time it takes to for animals to reach their slaughter 
weight boosts profit margins.
1  The method, if used widely, could also decrease meat prices, 
another economic benefit, though this benefit would accrue to the general public rather than to 
the producers. 
  From a public health perspective, however, we must face the risks of the development of 
antibiotic resistance in microbes that cause human diseases, many of which live in meat animals.  
This forces us to confront the task of balancing public health risks against economic benefits 
accrued to producers (potentially larger profit margins) and consumers (cheaper meat).  This 
raises the very difficult question of how one could balance two concepts that operate in separate 
                                                 
1  This increase in profits may only be temporary, however; the method could eventually become 
widespread, and competition and the subsequent increase in supply would decrease the market price of 
the product.
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realms of incomparable values; as Roger Traynor once famously asked, “Can you weigh a bushel 
of horsefeathers against next Thursday?”
2 
  Historically in the United States, we have come down on the side of the economic 
benefits, primarily on the grounds that the benefits are more demonstrable and certain than the 
risks, which are deemed by industry to be too speculative.  The FDA and Congress have also 
been historically reluctant to act on the risks, though recent exceptions have demonstrated 
increasing scrutiny of this issue, indicating that the balancing calculus may in the process of 
changing. 
  This paper begins by reviewing the evolution of scientific knowledge pertaining to the 
issues of antibiotic resistance and the transference of drug-resistant disease microbes from food-
producing animals to humans.  This is followed by a brief overview of the political entities that 
have dealt with the issues, including industry groups and consumer advocates.  This scientific 
and political background sets the stage for Part III of this paper, which consists of a historical 
treatment of the regulation of antibiotics used in animal feed.  Part IV speculates over the best 
policies for FDA to pursue, grounded in the scientific knowledge and the legal and practical 
frameworks discussed in the paper, and Part V concludes. 
II.  Background 
  A.  Scientific Background 
  The basic scientific concept relating to the issue of antibiotic resistance is certainly not 
new.  The notion that evolution occurs through natural selection in response to the environment’s 
                                                 
2  Brainerd Currie (The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 754 (1963)) traces this 
quote back to Prosser (Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 183, 225 (1949)), in its 
original form asking how "ten pounds of sugar can be weighed against half-past two in the afternoon," 
which in turn is attributed to an unidentified English judge.  
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selective pressures is a well-accepted and central tenet of modern biology.
3  Thus, across the 
backdrop of an antibiotic agent that kills microorganisms through a certain biochemical 
mechanism, successive generations of those microorganisms will become increasingly resistant 
against that agent, and likely also against similar agents that operate through a similar 
mechanism.  By the mid-twentieth century, this mechanism of bacterial evolution was 
demonstrated experimentally.
4 
  Robust debate relating to this issue is taking place in the medical literature with respect to 
prescriptions of antibiotics to humans, which is widely accepted as contributing to antibiotic 
resistance in human diseases.  Without a doubt, prescriptions to humans are the largest factor 
responsible for the evolution of human disease to resist antibiotics.  The debate over this issue 
involves public health balancing, weighing the public health benefits to present patients against 
public health risks to future patients, as well as considerable discussion over treatment protocols 
and other ways to deal with this threat.
5  Although the use of antibiotics in humans is the primary 
mechanism for the evolution of antibiotic-resistant human diseases, this paper does not address 
these difficult issues; the discussion here is limited to the use of antibiotics in agriculture.
6 
  One lesson from the human experience with antibiotics, however, may be transferred to 
animals, and that is the importance of dose.  The well-known treatment protocols in humans 
                                                 
3  See generally Charles Darwin, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES. 
4  Salvador Luria & Max Delbrück, Mutations of Bacteria from Virus Sensitivity to Virus Resistance, 28 
GENETICS 491 (1943). 
5   See generally Fred Tenover, CDC Director of the Office of Antimicrobial Resistance, Testimony before 
the U.S. Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee : CDC’s Role in Monitoring and 
Preventing Antimicrobial Resistance, revised April 19, 2011, available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/2008/06/t20080624e.html . 
6  For a paper discussing the many difficult issues raised by human use of antibiotics, see Joseph 
Gottfried, History Repeating? Avoiding a Return to the Pre-Antibiotic Age (2005) in Chapter VI.C.3 of 
the Food and Drug Law Electronic Book.  
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involve using a large enough dose to eradicate the disease-causing microbe, for a sufficient 
period of time to ensure that the microbes have all been eradicated.  Anything less creates the 
risk of selecting for antibiotic-resistant bacteria, as has long been recognized.
7  In the context of 
agriculture, this is a strong theoretical reason to believe that the low-level doses used for growth 
promotion pose a much greater hazard to public health than the more concentrated doses used to 
treat disease or prevent the spread of an outbreak of disease. 
  But with respect to the use of antibiotics in the context of agriculture, there is somewhat 
less of a consensus regarding the magnitude and nature of the problem than there is for human 
use.  Although defenders of the practice of administering antibiotics to food animals do not 
usually deny the theoretical premise—that exposure to antibiotics exerts selection pressure that 
causes subsequent generations of microbes to be resistant to them—they tend to question 
whether a threat to human health can be conclusively demonstrated.  The causal link between the 
evolution of antibiotic-resistant microbes in animals and corresponding antibiotic-resistant 
disease in humans is indeed difficult to demonstrate; though circumstantially the evidence may 
be strong, often other origins of the disease cannot be definitively ruled out.  Advocates for use 
                                                 
7   In Alexander Fleming’s Nobel Lecture, in which he recounted the story of the discovery of penicillin, 
he gave this caution:  
It is not difficult to make microbes resistant to penicillin in the laboratory by exposing them to 
concentrations not sufficient to kill them . . . . The time may come when penicillin can be bought 
by anyone in the shops. Then there is the danger that the ignorant man may easily underdose 
himself and by exposing his microbes to non-lethal quantities of the drug make them resistant. 
Here is a hypothetical illustration. Mr. X. has a sore throat. He buys some penicillin and gives 
himself, not enough to kill the streptococci but enough to educate them to resist penicillin. He 
then infects his wife. Mrs. X gets pneumonia and is treated with penicillin. As the streptococci are 
now resistant to penicillin the treatment fails. Mrs. X dies. Who is primarily responsible for Mrs. 
X’s death? Why Mr. X whose negligent use of penicillin changed the nature of the microbe. 
Moral: If you use penicillin, use enough. 
  Alexander Fleming, Nobel Lecture, Dec. 11, 1945, available at 
nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/medicine/laureates/1945/fleming-lecture.pdf  
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in animals also tend to question whether the evolution of antibiotic resistance in particular strains 
of disease-causing microbes actually has any practical implications for public health.  One such 
argument, for example, is that some common diseases usually resolve without antibiotic 
intervention, and thus antibiotic resistance in these strains of disease does not pose a human 
health risk. 
  Skeptics of regulation in this arena are undoubtedly correct about the existence of gaps in 
scientific knowledge on this issue.  A major reason for this is the complexity of the problem: 
tying a causal link, between particular uses of antibiotic and particular antibiotic-resistant 
foodborne (or other) illnesses, is a very difficult task when a very complex food supply chain 
stands between the two.   There are also problems of data collection on both ends of the chain.  
Patients rarely have the pathogens that cause their diseases cultured.  And many instances of 
foodborne illness resolve with time, regardless of whether the patient receives antibiotics; this 
can help mask the emergence of antibiotic-resistant pathogens that pose greater risk to members 
of vulnerable populations, such as children or the elderly. 
  Further, very little is known empirically about how much of each antibiotic is used in 
animal agriculture, and in what amounts, and for what purpose (disease treatment, disease 
prevention, or growth promotion).  Industry is not forthcoming with that data, which is protected 
as private business information, and in recent years industry has been generally loathe to 
acknowledge that antibiotics are used for growth promotion at all, having attempted to rebrand 
such uses as “health maintenance” or “disease prevention.”
8  Until just last year, there were no 
                                                 
8   The only mention of the phrase “growth promotion” on the website of the Animal Health Institute, the 
most important and vocal trade group for animal drugs, claims that growth promotion is synonymous 
with health maintenance: “health maintenance purposes, also called growth promotion.  (See 
definition for health maintenance.)” According to the Animal Health Institute, the definition of health 
maintenance is: “Shifting the population balance of the microflora in the gastrointestinal tract, thus  
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reliable figures even for the total amount of antibiotics used in animal agriculture, and the two 
primary estimates, given by a major consumer group on the one hand and a major industry group 
on the other, differed by several million pounds. 
  Finally, and perhaps most surprisingly, the exact mechanism by which antibiotics 
promote growth in food animals is itself not understood and subject to debate,
9 even though the 
fact that they do promote growth has been known for more than half a century.
10 
  So what do we know?  Based on the data made available by FDA in December 2010, 
animal agriculture consumes roughly 29 million pounds of antibiotics per year.
11  To put this in 
perspective, FDA estimates that the total amount of antibiotics prescribed to humans in the same 
year was 7 million pounds;
12 based on these figures, more than 80% of annual antibiotic use by 
weight in the United States goes to animal agriculture rather than human uses. 
  And despite all the difficulties in proving causation, three case studies of three outbreaks 
                                                                                                                                                            
improving nutrient utilization and resulting in healthy growth. Feed efficiency and average daily gain 
are indicators of response.”  This is a naked attempt to couch an economic benefit in the language of 
health.  “AHI: Key Industry Terms,” www.ahi.org/content.asp?contentid=718 (accessed 5/6/2011).   
9   Although the industry’s definition of “health maintenance,” supra note 8, claims that the mechanism 
of growth promotion involves action on gastrointestinal bacteria, there is no scientific consensus that 
this is the mechanism.  Other proposed mechanisms exist, including, for example, mechanisms 
involving shifts in energy metabolism unrelated to microbes. 
10  See P.R. Moore et al., Use of sulfasuxidine, streptothricin, and streptomycin in nutritional studies with 
the chick, 165 J. BIOL. CHEM. 437 (1946) (showing growth promotion effect in poultry); T.J. Cunha et 
al., Effect of aureomycin and other antibiotics on the pig, 9 J. ANIMAL SCI. 653 (1950) (showing 
growth promotion effect in swine); J.K. Loosli & H.D. Wallace, Influence of APF and aureomycin on 
the growth of dairy calves, 75 PROC. SOC. EXPERIMENTAL BIOL. MED. 531 (1950) (showing growth 
promotion effect in cattle). 
11  FDA CTR. FOR VETERINARY MEDICINE, “2009 Summary Report on Antimicrobials Sold or Distributed 
for Use in Food-Producing Animals” at Tbl. 1, available at 
www.fda.gov/downloads/ForIndustry/UserFees/AnimalDrugUserFeeActADUFA/UCM231851.pdf 
(domestic total of 13,067,100 kg/yr, converted to pounds on the basis of 2.20 lbs/kg). 
12  Ralph Loglisci, Animals Consume Lion’s Share of Antibiotics, Food Safety News (Dec. 27, 2010) 
(citing spokesperson at FDA’s Office of Surveillance and Epidemiology), available at 
www.foodsafetynews.com/2010/12/animals-consume-lions-share-of-antibiotics/.  
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in the late nineties were perhaps responsible for increasing public and governmental awareness 
and scrutiny of this issue.  Perhaps most prominent was a Danish study that was able to trace a 
particularly bad Salmonella outbreak (resulting in two deaths) of a strain that was resistant to 
many drugs, including fluoroquinolones (specifically the powerful drug ciprofloxacin) through 
the supply chain to a particular herd of swine that carried the identical multidrug-resistant 
bacteria.
13  Another study,
14 this one domestic, found that in Minnesotans suffering from 
Campylobacter infections, the rate at which those infections were resistant to ciprofloxacin 
increased from 1.3% in 1992 to 10.2% in 1998; this was correlated with the fact that a related 
antibiotic, enrofloxacin, was approved for use in U.S. poultry in 1996.
15  And a 2000 study of an 
isolated case alarmed the pediatric medicine community by demonstrating the possibility of 
resistance to cephalosporins, which are essential to treating serious diseases in children; the 
Nebraska boy in this case apparently acquired the drug-resistant strain from direct contact with 
cattle (on which the identical strain was found), while a related drug, ceftiofur, is approved for 
use in cattle.
16 
  Since this scientific awakening of sorts at the end of the 20
th Century, data have continued 
                                                 
13  Kåre Mølbak et al., An Outbreak of Multidrug-Resistant, Quinolone-Resistant Salmonella enterica 
Serotype Typhimurium DT104, 341 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1420 (1999). 
14  Kirk Smith et al., Quinolone-Resistant Campylobacter jejuni Infections in Minnesota, 1992–1998, 340 
N. ENGL. J. MED. 1525, 1530 (1999).  This finding is dwarfed by the experience of Spain, where 
regulation of use of the drugs was considerably more lenient in the early 1990s; after introduction of 
fluoroquinolones in Spanish poultry in 1990, fluoroquinolone resistance in clinical samples of 
Campylobacter spiked from less than 10%, pre-1990, to more than 40% in 1991 and increased to 85% 
by 1996.  Data reproduced in Ellen Silbergeld, Jay Graham, & Lance Price, Industrial Food Animal 
Production, Antimicrobial Resistance, and Human Health, 29 ANNUAL REV. PUBLIC HEALTH 151, 158 
(2008). 
15 This and other evidence led the FDA to withdraw the approval of enrofloxacin for use in poultry, see 
Part III.C infra. 
16 Paul Fey et al., Ceftriaxone-Resistant Salmonella Infection Acquired by a Child from Cattle, 342 N. 
ENGL. J. MED. 1242 (2000).  
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to develop that showed similar trends between the introduction of antibiotics for agricultural use 
and the increased rate of antibiotic-resistant bacteria in clinical isolates from sick patients.
17  A 
recent study got quite a response in the media by testing meat sold in the U.S., finding 
Staphylococcus aureus on 47% of samples, with 52% of these exhibiting multidrug-resistance.
18  
This only added to studies showing other species of multidrug-resistant bacteria present on U.S. 
meat.
19  Numerous other case studies have demonstrated other routes of transmission from 
animals to humans, including direct and community-based contact
20 and various environmental 
mechanisms, through waste, air, water, soil, food crops, and intermediate disease vectors such as 
flies.
21 
  The evidence, with a few exceptions, is largely what a lawyer would call 
“circumstantial,” yet the scientific weight continues to mount into scientific consensus among 
public health professionals.
22  And part of the urgency comes from the fact that new antibiotics 
are becoming hard to discover or develop; in the 1980s, new antibiotics were approved at a rate 
of 3 per year, while in the 21
st century through 2007, slightly more than one per year were 
approved; only two were approved in the years 2005, 2006, and 2007 combined.
23  From a 
scientist’s and public health professional’s perspective, the rational course of action in the face of 
                                                 
17 See Silbergeld et al., supra note 14, at 157–58 (citing studies). 
18 Andrew Waters et al., Multidrug-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus in US Meat and Poultry, 52 
CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1227 (2011). 
19 See id. at 1227 (citing FDA NARMS annual report); see also Silbergeld et al., supra note 14, at 158–59 
(citing studies). 
20 Silbergeld et al., supra note 14, at 159 (citing case studies). 
21 Id. at 159–61 (citing numerous references). 
22 For a typical editorial with a title that says it all, see Sherwood Gorbach, Antimicrobial Use in Animal 
Feed – Time to Stop, 345 N. England J. Med. 1202 (2001). 
23 EXTENDING THE CURE, Policy Brief 6 at 2 (May 2008), available at 
http://www.extendingthecure.org/sites/default/files/Policy_Brief6_May08_newdrugs.pdf.  
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these facts is to act to preserve these precious resources for treatment, and not risk squandering 
them for economic benefits.  With this background in mind, this paper now begins to examine 
the politics behind this issue and why, historically, the predominant scientific and public health 
view has not commanded our public policy. 
  B.  The Political Landscape 
  1) Federal Government Agencies 
 
The Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) is the main entity in the United States 
charged with evaluating the safety of antibiotics and regulating their use.  FDA’s authority in this 
regard derives from the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act), which defines a “drug” as an 
article “intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of disease in 
man or other animals.”
24  The FDA approves only those drugs for use in animals that have been 
shown to be “safe and effective,” with respect to the animal’s health.
25  However, because the 
animal will eventually be used as human food, FDA also must consider whether the use of the 
antibiotic somehow could lead to a risk in human health.  A primary consequence of this is that 
FDA sets antibiotic residue limits for meat.
26  But FDA’s duty is considerably broader than 
protecting against residues in food: food from food animals must be completely safe for human 
consumption.  (The debate on the exact nature of this safety standard will be discussed in further 
detail in Part III, infra.)  If using the antibiotic could lead to the evolution of antibiotic-resistant 
disease-causing microbes in the food animal, FDA may potentially choose not to approve the 
                                                 
24  FDCA § 201(g), 21 U.S.C. § 321(g) (2010). 
25  See FDCA § 512, 21 U.S.C. § 360b; 21 C.F.R. § 514.1(b)(8); Stauber v. Shalala, 895 F. Supp. 1178, 
1190–91 (W.D. Wisc. 1995). 
26  See generally 21 C.F.R. part 556, Tolerances for Residues of New Animal Drugs in Food (2010).  
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drug at all, basing its decision on public safety concerns. 
  FDA’s role is thus the most crucial and direct among the federal governmental agencies, 
acting as a gatekeeper and prescriber of standards of use of antibiotics administered to animals.  
Other government bodies also weigh in on the issue, though none have the regulatory authority 
of FDA.  The U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”), for instance, does not have any 
regulatory authority over the use of antibiotics given to animals, although USDA does 
occasionally issue guidance to producers of food animals regarding antibiotic use.
27  Given 
USDA’s statutory role as an advocate for producers, however, one would expect them to regulate 
antibiotic use only insofar as it serves the interests of the food animal producers; public health 
concerns, aside from meat quality, is not within their general jurisdiction.
28 
  The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) has been a relatively consistent 
government voice urging the limitation of the use of antibiotics in food animals, particularly 
cautioning against the use of antibiotics for growth promotion.  They have also occasionally 
opposed approval of particular therapeutic antibiotics for use in food animals, most notably 
enrofloxacin, which FDA approved for therapeutic use and then later withdrew, see Part III.C., 
infra.  They have also, since 1996, maintained the National Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring 
System (“NARMS”), which gathers crucial data on antibiotic resistant diseases and releases 
annual reports.
29   CDC is also one of the co-chairs (with FDA and the National Institutes of 
                                                 
27  See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE, ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE, 
Antimicrobial Resistance Issues in Animal Agriculture (May 2007), available at 
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/emergingissues/downloads/antiresist2007update.pdf. 
28  But note, as one of the many examples of the sometimes inexplicable and illogical carving up of 
authority between FDA and USDA, that animal biologics (e.g. vaccines) are regulated by USDA. 
29  See, e.g., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, National Antimicrobial Resistance 
Monitoring System Enteric Bacteria (NARMS): Human Isolates Final Report 2008 (2010), available 
at http://www.cdc.gov/narms/annual/2008/NARMS_2008_Annual_Report.pdf.  
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Health (“NIH”)) of the Interagency Task Force on Antimicrobial Resistance, established in 1999 
in response to a congressional hearing on the topic.
30 
  2) Industry and Trade Groups 
Producers of antibiotic drugs have ensured that their voices are heard in the debate over 
limiting the uses of their products.  One trade organization called the Animal Health Institute 
(“AHI”) has been particularly vocal.  AHI discloses its member companies,
31 which number 
twenty-four in all, including the major pharmaceutical companies such as Abbott, Bayer, Merck, 
Novartis, and Pfizer.  AHI’s stated chief goal is to “advocate . . . with government agencies, 
creating a stable regulatory environment based on sound science.”
32  Their positions have 
mirrored those of industry generally by opposing any limitation on use of antibiotics in food 
animals.  Notably, AHI even intervened as a non-party participant (i.e. supporting Bayer, the 
actual respondent) in FDA’s proceedings to withdraw the approval of the New Animal Drug 
Application for enrofloxacin; see Part III.C, infra. 
The American Veterinary Medical Association (“AVMA”), a professional organization 
representing veterinarians with the stated mission of “advanc[ing] the veterinary medical 
profession,”
33 acting as a “collective voice for its membership and for the profession,”
34 whose 
                                                 
30  The Interagency Task Force developed a Public Health Action Plan in 2001, and released Annual 
Reports through 2008.  The Interagency Task Force is still active and in the process of revising its 
action plan, a draft of which is open for public comment; see CDC, Draft Action Plan—A Public 
Health Action Plan to Combat Antimicrobial Resistance, 76 Fed. Reg. 14402 (Mar. 16, 2011). 
31  See Animal Health Institute Member Companies, available at 
http://www.ahi.org/content.asp?contentid=759 (accessed 5/6/2011). 
32  “About AHI,” http://www.ahi.org/content.asp?contentid=697 (accessed 5/6/2011). 
33  “About the AVMA: Mission / Objective” http://www.avma.org/about_avma/whoweare/mission.asp 
(accessed 5/6/2011). 
34  “About the AVMA: Who We Are” http:// http://www.avma.org/about_avma/default.asp (accessed 
5/6/2011).  
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members work in “private and corporate practice, government, industry, academia, and 
uniformed services.”
35  While not strictly an “industry” group, AVMA is clearly a group that has 
an interest in wider availability of animal drugs; their policy statements, too, have consistently 
weighed against any limitations whatsoever on the use of antibiotics in food animals, aside from 
occasional tepid endorsements of some of “advisory” guidelines. 
In contrast to these private interests, at least one other, major private interest has taken up 
the cause of eliminating non-therapeutic uses of antibiotics.  McDonald’s Corporation has 
established as its preferred policy that “antibiotics belonging to classes of compounds currently 
approved in one or more countries worldwide for use in human medicine [be] prohibited when 
used solely for growth promotion purposes.”
36 McDonald’s requires its direct suppliers to adhere 
to this policy, and states that it will otherwise be a favorable factor in making other supply 
decisions (i.e. for suppliers not in a “direct” relationship with McDonald’s).
37  While 
McDonald’s does not give data that would allow one to assess the real impact of its policy, we 
should nonetheless give strong consideration to the possibility that, in the company’s words, 
“voluntary, market-based actions can complement ongoing activities to address the issue of 
antibiotic resistance.”
38 Their policy also demonstrates that private interests can sometimes 
advance the public interest through the private market. 
Unsurprising, but worth noting, is that trade organizations dealing with human medicine 
                                                 
35  Id. 
36  MCDONALD’S CORP., “McDonald’s Global Policy on Antibiotic Use in Food Animals” 1 (June 2003), 
available at 
http://www.aboutmcdonalds.com/etc/medialib/aboutMcDonalds/socialresponsiblity.Par.33574.File.dat/
antibiotics_policy.pdf. 
37  Id. at 3. 
38  Id. at 1.  
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have tended to oppose the use of antibiotics in animals.  For example, the American Medical 
Assocation (“AMA”) has opposed approval of specific drugs for use in animals,
39 openly 
opposed use of antibiotics as growth promoters,
40 and supported legislation that would phase out 
all use of antibiotics for growth promotion in animals.
41  Other human medicine-oriented trade 
groups have aligned themselves similarly (e.g. the American Public Health Association, the 
American College of Preventative Medicine, the Ambulatory Pediatric Assocation, and the 
American Nurses Assocation have at various released statements critical of the use of antibiotics 
in animal agriculture.)   
  3) Consumer-Oriented Public Interest Groups 
The Union of Concerned Scientists (“UCS”) has been the primary consumer-oriented 
nonprofit that has drawn attention to issues of antibiotic resistance in many contexts, including 
animal agriculture.  Notably, UCS was the first entity to provide a transparent, credible estimate 
of antibiotic use in agriculture when such figures were entirely unknown to the world.
42  (FDA 
now collects data on total sales of animal antibiotics as a mandatory requirement of the Animal 
Drug User Fee Act Amendments of 2008;
43 UCS’s 2001 estimate of 29.6 million pounds per 
                                                 
39  Letter from Michael Maves, AMA’s Executive Vice President and CEO, to the Commissioner of Food 
and Drugs, March 19, 2007 (opposing NADA for use of cefquinome in cattle), available at 
www.keepantibioticsworking.com/new/resources_library.cfm?refID=97841. 
40  AMA Policy Statement H-440.895 (Resolution 508, April 2001), available at         www.ama-
assn.org/resources/doc/PolicyFinder/policyfiles/HnE/H-440.895.htm. 
41  Letter from Michael Maves, AMA’s Executive Vice President and CEO, to Representative Louise 
Slaughter, April 9, 2009 (supporting H.R. 1549 “Preservation of Antibiotics for Medical Treatment Act 
of 2009”), available at www.keepantibioticsworking.com/new/resources_library.cfm?refID= 106530. 
42  See Margaret Mellon, Charles Benbrook, & Karen Lutz Benbrook, HOGGING IT! ESTIMATES OF 
ANTIMICROBIAL USE IN LIVESTOCK (2001).  In this report, UCS documented the unavailability of the 
data, and questioned the reliability of AHI’s extremely low estimate of 17.8 million pounds for all 
animal uses, which AHI gave without stating its factual basis or methodology.  Id. at 58. 
43  110 P.L. 316, amending in relevant part FDCA § 512, 21 U.S.C. § 360b.  
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year
44 is remarkably close to the sales figures actually tabulated by FDA in 2009, 28.8 million 
pounds per year.
45)  In particular, UCS’s advocacy position is generally that classes of antibiotics 
that are important to the treatment of human disease should not be allowed for “subtherapeutic” 
or growth promotion purposes,
46 or more cautiously, that FDA, USDA and CDC need to study 
the matter much more quickly, rigorously and critically.
47 
The Center for Science in the Public Interest (“CSPI”) is another prominent consumer 
group known for its advocacy role with respect to the FDA.  CSPI has repeatedly urged the FDA 
to withdraw approval of certain antibiotics currently approved for growth promotion purposes, 
specifically focusing on those antibiotics from classes that are important to human medicine.
48  
FDA has not taken action on such calls; for example, CSPI’s 1999 petition singled out 
virginiamycin, a streptogramin (a class of drugs used to treat human diseases, for which few or 
no alternatives exist
49) which was (and still is) approved for growth promotion in swine, poultry 
and cattle.
50 
In 2006, a grant from the Pew Charitable Trusts established, in partnership with Johns 
Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, the Pew Commission on Industrial Farm Animal 
Production.  In April 2008, the Commission released a report recommending the restriction of 
                                                 
44  Mellon et al., supra note 42, at 60. 
45  See supra note 11. 
46  Mellon et al., supra note 42, at 6–7. 
47  Id. at 64–65. 
48  See, e.g., FDA, Second Tentative Response to CSPI’s Citizen Petition, FDA Docket No. 99P-0485 
(Feb. 28, 2001), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CVM/CVMFOIAElectronicReadingRoom/
UCM129142.pdf. 
49  Mellon et al., supra note 42, at 108. 
50  See 21 C.F.R. § 558.635 (d)(1)(iv)–(v); § 558.635 (d)(2)(i)–(ii), (iv); § 558.635 (d)(3)(i), (iii) (2010).  
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use of antimicrobials to reduce the risk of antimicrobial resistance to medically important 
antibiotics, including the recommendation that FDA “phase out and ban use of antimicrobials for 
nontherapeutic (i.e. growth promoting) use in food animals . . . .”
51  Notably, however, the Pew 
Commission’s recommendations were based not just on public health, but also on environmental 
impact, animal welfare, and the social and economic effects of concentrated agriculture on rural 
America; while analyzing antibiotic use from the perspective of all these effects is, in my view, 
an admirable and important task, consideration of all of them is outside the scope of this paper. 
But there are also other examples of public interest groups which are not focused 
primarily on human health taking up the issue of antibiotic use in animals, including notable 
environmental groups.  In a 1984 petition, the National Resources Defense Council (“NRDC”) 
asked that New Animal Drug Applications be suspended on an imminent harm theory; after a 
hearing
52 their petition was denied.
53  Another group, the Environmental Defense Fund, joined 
CSPI’s March 9, 1999 petition.
54  And, occasionally, animal rights groups have raised the issue 
of antibiotic use as an animal welfare issue, as they can be used to promote more intensive 
farming.
55  But the relative impact of environmental and animal rights groups is certainly less 
than the consumer- and science-oriented groups that have continued to play a large role in 
framing the debates. 
                                                 
51  See PEW COMM. ON INDUSTRIAL FARM ANIMAL PRODUCTION, Putting Meat on the Table: Industrial 
Farm Animal Production in America 61 (2008). 
52  49 Fed. Reg. 49645 (Dec. 21, 1984). 
53  U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., Decision of the secretary denying petition to suspend 
new animal drug applications for subtherapeutic uses of penicillin and tetracyclines in animal feed, 
Docket No. 84P-0399 (Nov. 19, 1985) 
54  See FDA, supra note 48. 
55  See, e.g. Animal Legal Defense Fund Boston v. Provimi Veal Corp., 626 F. Supp. 278 (D. Mass. 1986).  
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  4) Congress 
 
Congress is, theoretically, the most powerful voice of all in this process, having the 
capability to amend the FD&C Act, which it does frequently for various purposes.  However, 
when it comes to antibiotic use in animal agriculture, Congress has not made any great 
interventions. 
One important role Congress has served, however, is the direction of its research arm, the 
Government Accountability Office (formerly the General Accounting Office).  Two recent 
reports have been influential,
56 the first of which led in part to the establishment of the 
Interagency Task Force on Antimicrobial Resistance, see supra Part II.B.(1). 
In terms of legislation, Democratic Congresswoman Louise Slaughter has repeatedly 
proposed legislation that would forbid the use of antibiotics for growth promotion purposes in 
U.S. livestock.
57  Overall, such legislation seems unlikely to pass; it had, by most accounts, its 
most favorable opportunity with the large Democratic majority in the 111
th Congress, when it 
advanced to Committee Hearings on July 13, 2009.  Even then, however, pressure on 
representatives from significant meat-producing states was enough to prevent any action on the 
bill.  One can speculate that it would take a massive, widely-publicized drug-resistant disease 
outbreak, with a smoking gun at the feet of a particular herd of meat animals, before Congress 
would pass such legislation.  This may be another instance of a common political scenario: the 
                                                 
56  GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE: FEDERAL AGENCIES NEED TO BETTER 
FOCUS EFFORTS TO ADDRESS RISK TO HUMANS FROM ANTIBIOTIC USE IN ANIMALS, GAO-04-490 
(Apr. 22, 2004); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FOOD SAFETY: THE AGRICULTURAL USE OF 
ANTIBIOTICS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR HUMAN HEALTH, GAO-RCED-99-74 (Apr. 28, 1999). 
57 Most recently, Preservation of Antibiotics for Medical Treatment Act of 2011, 112
th Cong. H.R. 965 
(introduced 3/9/2011).  
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interest of the meat producers is too strong, and not worth defying for the sake of members of the 
broader public, for whom the issue barely registers.  The issue has a few strong supporters on 
one side, such as Rep. Slaughter, and a few equally staunch supporters on the other side, for 
instance Rep. Steve King (Republican of Iowa),
58 and a large swath of Congress for whom 
taking a side has few advantages. 
  5) Internationally 
The World Health Organization (“WHO”) has been important for its role comparing the 
different experiences of countries that have taken different approaches to the problem of 
antibiotic use in food animals.
59  WHO recently highlighted the issue by declaring antimicrobial 
resistance generally to be the theme of 2011 World Health Day.
60  Generally, WHO has 
advocated “terminat[ing] non-therapeutic use of antimicrobials, such as the use of antimicrobials 
as growth promoters.”
61  In this respect it has been similar to domestic health advocacy 
organizations, but has the distinction of being cited frequently for a more global view. 
 
III. History of Animal Antibiotic Regulation in the United States 
 
  A.  Early Regulation 
As described in Parts I and II.A, supra, the potential for antibiotic resistance, particularly 
                                                 
58 Steve King, “Farmers, not bureaucrats, know best,” The Hill’s Congress Blog (Jan. 26, 2010), available 
at http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/78037-farmers-not-bureaucrats-know-best-rep-steve-
king . 
59 Discussed in Part IV, infra. 
60 WHO, Press Release: Urgent action necessary to safeguard drug treatments (April 6, 2011), available at 
www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2011/whd_20110406/en/index.html. 
61 WHO, World Health Day 2011 Policy Brief 4D, at 2, available at www.who.int/world-health-
day/2011/presskit/whd2011_fs4d_subanimal.pdf.  
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resulting from constant, low-dose exposure, was recognized almost as early as antibiotics 
themselves were discovered.
62  In 1970, the FDA Commissioner established a Task Force to 
study the risks associated with the use of antibiotics in animal feed and to make 
recommendations.
63  The Task Force concluded from the available evidence that the “prevalence 
of multiresistant R-factor bearing pathogenic and non-pathogenic bacteria in animals has 
increased and has been related to the use of antibiotics and sulfonamide drugs[,]” and that there 
“has been an increase in the prevalence of antibiotic and sulfonamide resistant bacteria in 
man.”
64  The Task Force further concluded, based on “extensive documentation,” that “[h]uman 
illnesses and death have been reported due to both antibiotic-sensitive and antibiotic-resistant 
bacteria of animal origin.”
65  The Task Force recommended that the FDA revoke all permitted 
use of antibiotics for growth promotion, and only to allow such drugs to be used 
subtherapeutically again if they were found to satisfy the Task Force’s Guidelines for such use.
66  
Like most public health advocates have maintained for decades, the 1970 Task Force apparently 
gave considerable weight to the evidence and theory that low-level, constant doses of antibiotics 
will lead inevitably to antibiotic resistant microbes. 
  It came as somewhat of a surprise, then, when the FDA Commissioner, just one year later, 
backpedaled considerably from the Task Force’s proposed approach.  In contrast to the Task 
                                                 
62 See supra notes 4, 7 and accompanying text. 
63 FDA, “Antibiotic and Sulfonamide Drugs in Animal Feeds: Proposed Statement of Policy” 37 Fed. 
Reg. 2444, 2444 (Feb. 1, 1972). 
64 Id. at 2444–45. 
65 Id. at 2445. 
66 Id.  The Guidelines themselves were, mysteriously, not reproduced in the Federal Register or proposed 
regulations, and only appeared in the Task Force’s Report to the Commissioner.  However, it seems 
clear from the face of the regulation that the Task Force was most concerned with (1) whether the 
antibiotics in question belong to classes which are crucial for human medical use, and (2) whether 
evidence demonstrated that resistance to that antibiotic was not likely to endanger human health.  Id.  
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Force’s approach, in which antibiotics were to be delisted for subtherapeutic use until proven 
safe for such use, FDA’s policy changed into the difficult balancing described in the Introduction 
to this paper, supra.  “Safety,” FDA’s new policy stated, suddenly did not mean absence of 
human health risks; rather, it meant “the reasonable certainty in the minds of competent scientists 
that [use of the drug] is not harmful when balanced against the benefits to be obtained from the 
drug.”
67  According to the new policy, the “benefits accrue in terms of efficient land usage, labor 
savings, and more efficient conversion of animal feed to animal protein, thereby making a major 
contribution to the abundance of food from animals.”
68  And while the “Commissioner 
recognize[d] that difficult questions exist with respect to the benefit-risk analysis”
69 of safety 
against economic benefits, the new policy seemed to resolve these questions neatly in almost the 
same breath: a line in the sand was drawn, separating “potential and theoretical hazards” on the 
one hand from “a serious health hazard, [for which] withdrawal should immediately be ordered” 
on the other.
70  The Federal Register notice went on to declare that all of the hazards described by 
the Task Force fell into the former category: “Where, as here, only a potential or theoretical 
hazard is raised, which does not show that the drug is not shown to be safe, . . . the proper way to 
proceed is [by the NADA process] . . . .”
71 By drawing this line between “potential” and 
“serious” risks (though there is no reason principled a risk cannot be both at once), and by 
characterizing all of the Task Force’s findings as the “potential and theoretical,” the new policy 
placed a heavy thumb on the scale in favor of the economic benefits, and this thumb 
                                                 
67  FDA, “Antibiotic and Sulfonamide Drugs in the Feed of Animals” 38 Fed. Reg. 9811, 9812 (Apr. 20, 
1973) (emphasis added). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 9813. 
71 Id.  
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subsequently rested on the scale for decades.  Further, by dismissing the “theoretical hazards” as 
hazards that “do[] not show that the drug is not shown to be safe,” the FDA arguably managed to 
flip the initial burden, which ordinarily is on the NADA applicant to demonstrate that the drug is 
safe; this should require that the NADA applicant affirmatively demonstrate that the “theoretical 
hazards” of resistance are indeed insignificant. 
The new policy, however, required firms wishing to market their antibiotic products to 
comply with new filing requirements of safety data.
72  Although the details filed by these entities 
are confidential, and although some products were apparently delisted (at least temporarily) for 
failure to comply with the regulatory requirements,
73 most firms were quickly able to get their 
products relisted (and some new products approved), including for growth promotion purposes.
74  
The economic benefits of growth promotion carried the day, and the Task Force’s “potential and 
theoretical hazards” of resistance were apparently accorded no weight in the balance, being 
instead left behind to serve as a historical footnote. 
A 1977 change in presidential administrations, however, brought a new Commissioner of 
Food and Drugs, Donald Kennedy.  Commissioner Kennedy apparently deemed antibiotic 
resistance a significant threat, but apparently decided against taking up another battle to redefine 
the previous Commissioner’s theory of “safety” that incorporated economic benefits.  Instead, he 
opted for a different tool of policy making, the relatively young National Environmental Policy 
Act, noting that antibiotic-resistant microbes in the environment generally would have an impact 
                                                 
72 The filing requirements remain codified, as amended, at 21 C.F.R. § 558.15. 
73 39 Fed. Reg. 283 93 (Aug. 6, 1974); 41 Fed. Reg. 8282 (Feb. 25, 1976). 
74 39 Fed. Reg. 28382 (Aug. 6, 1974); 40 Fed. Reg. 13959 (Mar. 27, 1975); 41 Fed. Reg. 8282 (Feb. 25, 
1976).  
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on public health.
75  In light of this, the Commissioner planned to propose the banning of 
subtherapeutic use of penicillin;
76 as well as careful restrictions on tetracyclines.
77  Hearings 
went forward on this,
78 and GAO in effect encouraged the effort by criticizing FDA’s failure to 
act sooner on subtherapeutic antibiotic use.
79  The effort apparently ultimately stalled with yet 
another change in administration, and in 1981 industry requested that approvals of new drugs 
resume as usual, a request that was granted;
80 a request to dismiss the previous administration’s 
proceedings, however, was denied, and the proceedings have apparently been held in abeyance 
ever since, “pending completion of studies mandated by Congress.”
81  However, these two 
notices, published on the same day, make odd bedfellows, and one can legitimately question 
whether the latter was an effective termination of the proceedings, in light of the fact that the 
former notice demonstrated FDA’s willingness to approve new penicillin and tetracycline 
containing drug premixes.   
For the remainder of the 1980s and much of the 1990s, however, FDA did not revisit the 
subject; again, it seemed that the battle for public policy in this area had been won by industry, 
                                                 
75 FDA, “Restriction of Subtherapeutic Use of Antibacterials in Animal Feeds: Intent to Propose Rules 
and Calls for Environmental Impact Data” 42 Fed. Reg. 27264, 27265 (May 27, 1977). 
76 Id. at 27264.  Note that the FDA Task Force five years earlier targeted subtherapeutic use of penicillin 
in particular as posing a substantial risk; see FDA, supra note 63, at 2445 (“antibiotics which select for 
bacteria resistant to the antibiotics most critically needed for therapy of man and animals be prohibited 
from use in animal feeds.  In this category at the present time are . . . penicillins . . . .”) (emphasis 
added). 
77 FDA, supra note 75, at 27265. 
78 See Peter Barton Hutt & Richard Merrill, FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 652 n. 1 (2d 
ed. 1991) (citing numerous Federal Register notices corresponding to these hearings). 
79 GAO, NEED TO ESTABLISH SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTIBIOTICS USED IN ANIMAL FEEDS, 
HRD-77-81 (Jun. 27, 1977). 
80 FDA, “New Animal Drugs for Use in Animal Feeds; Penicillin- and Tetracycline (Chlortetracycline and 
Oxytetracycline)-Containing Premixes” 48 Fed. Reg. 4490 (Feb. 1, 1983). 
81 FDA, “Penicillin and Tetracycline (Chlortetracycline and Oxytetracycline) in Animal Feeds: Denial of 
Petitions” 48 Fed. Reg. 4554, 4555 (Feb. 1, 1983).  
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the balance of economic benefits definitively decided against the “theoretical” risks of harm 
from antibiotic resistance. 
  B.  Increasing Scrutiny in the 1990s 
While FDA’s interest in the subject seemed to wane, the interest of scientists, health 
professionals, and consumer groups seemed only to grow.  The 1990s saw increasing number of 
independent articles published in peer-reviewed journals discussing the issues and mechanisms 
of antibiotic resistance.
82 The Institute of Medicine prepared a report that included risk 
assessments that attempted to calculate the effect of antibiotic use in livestock on human health.
83 
It was in response to another Institute of Medicine report in the early 1990s that CDC 
began laying the groundwork for the National Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring System 
(NARMS).
84  NARMS annual reports began to shed light on the increasing rate of antibiotic 
resistance across the country, further propelling the issue into the public and Congressional 
debate.  Consumer advocates prepared reports on antibiotic resistance and use in agriculture;
85 a 
coalition of consumer groups submitted a petition to FDA urging specific action on specific 
antibiotics;
86 and Congress held hearings on “Antimicrobial Resistance: Solutions to a Growing 
Public Health Problem,” ultimately creating the impetus for the creation of the Interagency Task 
                                                 
82 See, e.g. Mitchell Cohen, Epidemiology of Drug Resistance: Implications for a Post-Antimicrobial Era, 
257 SCIENCE 1050 (1992); George Jacoby & Gordon Archer, New Mechanisms of Bacterial Resistance 
to Antimicrobial Agents, 324 N. ENGLAND J. MED. 601 (1991); Stuart Levy, Editorial: Starting Life 
Resistance-Free, 323 N. ENGLAND J. MED. 335 (1990). 
83 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, “Human Health Risks with the Subtherapeutic Use of Penicillin or 
Tetracyclines in Animal Feed” (National Academies Press 1989); 
84 See CDC, “About NARMS” available at www.cdc.gov/narms/about_narms.htm. 
85 Ctr. For Science in the Public Interest, “Protecting the Crown Jewels of Medicine: A strategic plan to 
preserve the effectiveness of antibiotics” (1998); Mellon et al., supra note 42 (Union of Concerned 
Scientists report).  
86 See supra note 48.  
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Force on Antimicrobial Resistance. 
The mounting pressure and attention may have, on its own, been enough to force FDA to 
take up the issue again.  However, the “smoking gun”
87 of the late nineties case studies,
88 in 
particular the one demonstrating domestic strains of ciprofloxacin-resistant Campylobacter,
89 
forced FDA’s hand and laid the ground for the first (and, to date, only) true battle over the 
revocation of a NADA antibiotic product. 
  C.  FDA Takes Action: The Enrofloxacin Case 
On October 4, 1996, FDA approved NADA 140-828, Bayer’s formulation of enrofloxacin, 
marketed under the trade name Baytril.  Just over four years later, on October 31, 2000, FDA 
sought to withdraw that NADA, initiating the process by publishing a Notice of Opportunity for 
Hearing.
90  Bayer notified FDA that it would exercise its right to a hearing on November 29, 
2000, setting up the first-ever adversarial proceeding to withdraw a NADA antibiotic. 
FDA had a lot riding on this case.  FDA undoubtedly wanted to demonstrate to the public 
and to industry that it was serious about antibiotic resistance and the associated risks to public 
health.  Further, this adversarial proceeding presented a favorable opportunity to make good law 
for future agency action.  Of course, the high stakes nature of this litigation would cut both ways, 
and given the unlikelihood of Congressional intervention in this area of law, FDA could equally 
be stuck with any unfavorable law made during the litigation.  With limited resources and the 
                                                 
87 This characterization attributed to Dr. Abigail Salyers in Dan Ferber, Superbugs on the Hoof? 288 
Science 792, 792 (2000). 
88 Supra notes 13–14, 16. 
89 Smith et al., supra note 14. 
90 FDA, “Enrofloxacin for Poultry: Opportunity for Hearing (NOOH)” 65 Fed. Reg. 64954 (Oct. 31, 
2000).  
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level of involvement that the case required, this one case, though formally only about one 
antibiotic’s NADA, would stand for much larger questions of law and FDA’s authority and 
ability to regulate antibiotics generally. 
But FDA had reasons for optimism about its ability to win this particular case.  On factual 
grounds, first, the study by Smith et al., noted supra at footnote 14, was fairly rigorous, testing 
the rate of resistance in actual instances of illness over time, pre- and post-approval.  Second, 
years of scientific studies had shown that Campylobacter infections are primarily acquired from 
poultry and not other sources; the enrofloxacin formulation in question was approved only for 
poultry.  Third, FDA finally had at its disposal, thanks to NARMS, a larger pool of data showing 
the incidence of fluoroquinolone-resistant Campylobacter infections over time.  And finally, in 
what can be viewed in part as a collateral indication of the strength of the factual case, another 
manufacturer of another fluorquinolone product, Abbott Laboratories’ sarafloxacin, took the 
unusual step of voluntarily withdrawing its NADAs for its sarafloxacin products.
91 
Perhaps more interesting than the seemingly solid factual grounds for the decision, 
however, was the potential establishment of FDA’s legal authority to take this action.  FDA took 
this opportunity to take a broader definition of “safety” in this context, citing, in a daring and 
perhaps controversial move, nothing more than legislative history from the FD&C Act’s food 
additive provision, defining “safe” as “reasonable certainty of no harm.”
92  This is a far cry from 
the approach of balancing “reasonable certainty in the minds of competent scientists . . . against 
the [economic or other] benefits to be obtained from the drug”
93 discussed in Part III.A., above.  
                                                 
91  NADA 141-017 and 141-018; opportunity for hearing waived, id.; final withdrawal effective at 66 
Fed. Reg. 21400 (Apr. 30, 2001). 
92  65 Fed. Reg. at 64956 (citing H. Rept. 2284, 85
th Cong., 2d sess. 4095 (1958)).   
93  Supra note 67.  
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But here, too, the FDA had a favorable wind at its back in recent precedents.  Specifically, 
Supreme Court cases since the 1980s have established that, generally speaking, federal agencies 
should not consider economic costs or benefits unless Congress has explicitly instructed them to 
do so, and particularly when agencies are dealing with safety and health.
94 Although not (yet) 
explicitly applied to the FD&C Act, this interpretative trend undoubtedly frowns upon the 
incorporation of economic benefits into the analysis of whether a drug or food additive is “safe.”  
Based on this legal trend, FDA would seem to have strong grounds for drastically narrowing the 
scope of the meaning of “safety” from the definition that had been, de facto, historically applied. 
The litigation would also prove to be a legal test of how strictly bound by its prior actions 
FDA is.  In this context, how easy is it for FDA to reverse its judgment from just a few years 
earlier that a certain drug is safe for use in animals?  Under FD&C Act Section 512(e)(1)(B),
95 in 
order to withdraw approval for a NADA, FDA must show that “new evidence not contained in 
[the original] application or not available . . . until after such application was approved . . . 
evaluated together with the evidence available . . . when the application was approved, shows 
that [the] drug is not shown to be safe for use . . . .” (emphasis added).  How much new evidence 
justifies withdrawal?  And how can we make sense of this requirement in light of the fact that the 
mechanisms of antibiotic resistance, and the existence of the risk of transference of antibiotic-
resistant pathogens to humans, have been known for decades?  Can FDA simply change its mind 
whenever it wants on any given NADA, citing the latest scientific study as a piece of new 
evidence?  This case may have had an exceptionally strong and current body of evidence, but the 
                                                 
94  See American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 511-12 (1981) (rejecting 
OSHA’s attempt to incorporate economic cost-benefit into health assessments); Whitman v. American 
Trucking Ass’ns., 531 U.S. 457, 471 (2001) (finding that EPA may not incorporate cost considerations 
into air quality standard setting absent Congressional intent that such an analysis be done).   
95 21 U.S.C. § 360b(e)(1)(B).  
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legal ruling on the evidentiary issues would have implications for other potential agency actions. 
The litigation itself was a drawn-out affair before an Administrative Law Judge.  Though 
initiated in late 2000, Bayer’s request for a hearing was not granted until early 2002, and soon 
thereafter the trade association AHI filed to participate in the hearing as well.  By late 2002, all 
parties (including FDA) had submitted direct testimonial evidence in writing.  In mid-2003, oral 
hearings were held at FDA for the purposes of cross-examination.  Briefs were submitted by all 
parties, and on March 16, 2004, the ALJ published his initial decision in favor of FDA.  Pursuant 
to FDA’s rules for the proceeding, FDA and Bayer/AHI were permitted to file exceptions to the 
Initial Decision (in May 2004), and responses to each others’ exceptions (in July 2004).  Acting 
Commissioner Lester Crawford then issued FDA’s Final Decision in July 2005, responding to 
the Initial Decision and Exceptions, and ruling in favor of the FDA, to withdraw approval of 
enrofloxacin. 
 A few things were noteworthy about the Commissioner’s decision.  First, on the issue of 
defining “safety,” described above, the Commissioner took into account the Supreme Court case 
law regarding the permissibility of cost/benefit analysis, holding that FDA was not intended by 
Congress to engage in cost/benefit analysis when weighing safety.
96  However, the 
Commissioner did not limit this discussion to simply economic benefits and costs, but discussed 
whether health cost/benefit analysis was appropriate.  He contrasted his position with that of the 
ALJ, who declined to weigh animal health and welfare benefits against risks to humans, though 
the ALJ was, clearly, technically correct on this point.
97  But the definition of “safe” as requiring 
“reasonable certainty of no harm” goes even further: according to the Commissioner, this 
                                                 
96 FINAL DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER, WITHDRAWAL OF APPROVAL OF THE NEW ANIMAL DRUG 
APPLICATION FOR ENROFLOXACIN IN POULTRY, Docket No. 00N-1571, at 102-03. 
97 Id. at 93.  
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definition does not even allow for the balancing of human health benefits against human safety 
concerns.
98  Presumably, then, even if the use of antimicrobials in animal feed were shown to 
have enormous human health benefits, the smallest of human health risks would control under 
the “reasonable certainty of no harm” standard.  One can question the wisdom of this reading, 
but it is a logical reading of the stated definition, and it undoubtedly gives FDA broader power in 
the withdrawal process. 
The Commissioner’s decision also shed some light on the evidentiary question.  Bayer 
argued that, because FDA knew of the risks of antibiotic resistance before approving the drug, 
and had plenty of evidence before it that would caution against approving the drug, subsequent 
studies pointing to the same conclusion could not be considered “new evidence.”  The 
Commissioner wisely rejected what he called a “content-driven definition of ‘new,’”
99 but 
unfortunately did not give much guidance on a better definition of “new,” stating merely that 
“[i]f the proffered evidence was developed or discovered after approval and is not the evidence 
relied on for approval, then it is ‘new.’”
100  This does not resolve some objections.  Does the 
testimony of one more expert on the theoretical basis for resistance count as “new” evidence?  A 
study that replicates the result of a previous study?  A new meta-analysis of studies that were 
relied on in the original application?  Some may argue that it is unclear under the 
Commissioner’s definition what constrains FDA from changing its mind at will, and what in the 
manner of “new evidence” FDA must ferret out in order to support its decision to withdraw the 
drug. 
                                                 
98 Id. at 94. 
99  Id. at 86. 
100 Id. at 90.  
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Through the ALJ’s and Commissioner’s decision, FDA essentially won the case on every 
point of fact and law.  Bayer could not obtain a stay of the judgment pending appeal, and as a 
result Bayer decided not to appeal at all.
101  However, five years of litigation was a considerable 
use of FDA resources for the withdrawal of just one drug; although FDA has demonstrated it can 
succeed through this method, it lacks the time and resources to do so on a broad scale.  Formally, 
this case proved to be a big victory for FDA, and perhaps it serves as a warning to industry that 
FDA has the power to take such action.  Realistically, however, this cannot be the mechanism 
through which FDA controls the use of the dozens of antibiotics now permitted for use in animal 
agriculture. 
  D.  Recent Developments 
  Since the initiation of the enrofloxacin action, FDA has released two major guidance 
documents for industry.  Guidance for Industry #152 (“GFI #152”)
102 provides a detailed, 
comprehensive analysis of what FDA will consider, going forward, in decisions on NADAs for 
antibiotics.  This guidance spells out what is expected of NADA filers in the brave new world in 
which the economic benefits of these drugs do not justify human health risks; FDA now wants 
details so that it can be reasonably certain of no harm in approving the new drugs for specific 
uses.  One can wonder, and it remains an open question, whether, going forward under current 
policy, FDA will ever be willing to approve future NADAs for growth-promotion purposes, as 
opposed to disease treatment (one can speculate that the answer is perhaps yes, if, for example, 
                                                 
101 The costs and risks of appeal apparently were not justified in the absence of the ability to keep selling 
the drug while the case was on appeal.  The inability to obtain a stay was a deciding factor in Bayer’s 
decision not to appeal (Robert Nicholas, attorney for Bayer, personal communication). 
102 FDA, “Guidance for Industry: Evaluating the Safety of Antimicrobial New Animal Drugs with Regard 
to Their Microbiological Effects on Bacteria of Human Health Concern,” October 23, 2003.  
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the drug has no analogs used in human medicine). 
  Much more recently, and pertaining more relevantly to the dozens of drugs approved for 
use in animals before the release of GFI #152, is Draft Guidance #209.
103  This draft guidance 
document contains subtle hints that FDA is interested in adopting a more aggressive stance 
against antibiotics used at subtherapeutic levels.  In particular, FDA states in this document: 
In light of the risk that antimicrobial resistance poses to public health, FDA 
believes that the use of medically important antimicrobial drugs in food-producing 
animals for production purposes (e.g., to promote growth or improve feed 
efficiency) represents an injudicious use of these important drugs. Production uses 
are not directed at any specifically identified disease, but rather are expressly 
indicated and used for the purpose of enhancing the production of animal-derived 
products.
104 
 
  The framework of the draft guidance, moreover, draws a line between drugs approved 
prior to GFI #152 and drugs approved pursuant to GFI #152; the latter have satisfied FDA’s 
current policies, while the former (older drugs, including many approved for growth promotion 
purposes) are (implicitly) suspect in the eyes of FDA.
105 
  FDA is also urging the “phase-in [of] the practice of including veterinary oversight or 
consultation in the use of [medically important antibiotics].”
106  The fact that FDA would like to 
require veterinarians to be more involved is another sign of disapproval of the use of antibiotics 
indiscriminately for “production” purposes. 
  News reports also have provided insight into FDA’s current thinking.  Late last year, 
FDA officials reportedly told consumer advocates that it was attempting to obtain voluntary 
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cooperation from industry, as an alternative to impossibly long legal processes (such as the 
enrofloxacin proceedings).
107  The draft guidance may have been merely the first step in 
attempting to coax “voluntary” action.  Steve Roach, a consumer advocate, claimed that one 
official “seemed quite confident that some company was getting close to doing something;”
108 it 
is unclear what incentives the alleged company had to voluntarily move forward, but whatever 
this “something” was, it has not yet materialized in the several months since. 
IV. Analysis of FDA Policy and Possible Approaches 
FDA, through the enrofloxacin case, has established a strong legal precedent for its authority 
and ability to take action to withdraw currently approved antibiotics.  However, its capability in 
this arena lacks practical strength: the entitlement to a hearing granted Bayer almost five more 
years of continued sales of their product.  If the expected profits of the product exceed the 
amount it costs to hire lawyers for the administrative proceeding, the drug manufacturer can still 
come out ahead by opposing even the strongest case with the most minimal defense.  Thus, the 
threat of withdrawal of individual drugs, one at a time, may not strike fear in the hearts of 
companies with robust animal drug sales. 
Furthermore, even though FDA has changed its legal standards for what constitutes “safe” 
since many of antibiotics were approved for growth promotion, withdrawal of these drugs still 
requires a factual inquiry about whether there is sufficient and reliable new evidence that the use 
of the drugs is demonstrably less safe than it was at the time of its approval.  This may not 
always be an easy burden to meet. 
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Analysis of FDA’s current, internal plans to attain their policy objectives through 
“voluntary” compliance is a difficult task, perhaps slightly less speculative than the reading of 
tea leaves.  However, one potential strategy FDA may be employing to further its policy goals  is 
an attempt to drive a wedge between veterinarians and producers, who currently speak with more 
or less one voice in the U.S.
109  This is not the case in other countries where veterinarians are 
kept in high demand by stringent requirements for prescribing drugs to livestock.  Thus, when 
FDA’s Draft Guidance #209 calls for greater veterinarian involvement in all treatment decisions, 
one could speculate that this not only is designed as an attack on indiscriminate use of 
antibiotics, but also as an enticement to the veterinarian profession of a possible regulatory 
subsidy for their work. 
Likewise, the imagination can run wild with speculation about what implicit promises, 
signals, or threats FDA is sending companies when urging their voluntary compliance with Draft 
Guidance #209, particularly the partial delisting of growth promotion.  Could it be a prisoner’s 
dilemma type of situation, where the first mover gets leniency (i.e. FDA acts only against 
competitors)?  Could FDA be playing antibiotic manufacturers off of vaccine manufacturers?  
Could FDA be threatening action to totally withdraw certain drugs, but with a willingness to 
settle for mere withdrawal of growth-promotion purposes?  Or does FDA refuse to consider any 
of these tactics that might call into question its integrity?  Is industry duping FDA into prolonged 
discussions that will lead nowhere so that FDA will further delay regulatory action, as some 
consumer advocates fear?
110  Perhaps only insiders know the answers to these questions; to an 
outsider, FDA’s strategy for dealing with the threat of antibiotic resistance is far from clear, but a 
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fascinating topic for speculation.  But those of us in favor of fast action on this public health 
threat hope that FDA is opting for somewhat more strong-arm tactics, attempting to leverage 
their limited yet viable litigation resources into (somewhat) voluntary actions from a number of 
companies. 
V.  Conclusion 
 
At bottom, the issue of antibiotic resistance in animal agriculture in modern times has come 
down to a battle of competing interests, which pits meat producers and drug manufacturers 
against practically everyone else in the general public.  The economic benefits accruing to the 
former have, historically, been permitted to outweigh the public health risks incurred to society 
as a whole, and this has undoubtedly resulted in some amount of unnecessary disease and 
death.
111  FDA’s legal policies, though once tipping strongly in favor of economic benefits, now 
weigh heavily in favor of public health; historical laws and regulations, however, are ossified in 
such a way that continues to benefits those who gain economically from the overuse of 
antibiotics.  No easy path to changing the status quo exists, and it remains to be seen whether 
FDA’s current strategy will succeed, or indeed whether FDA even has such a strategy.  If not, it 
may take a public health crisis to coax action out of Congress, or voluntary action out of 
industry, to break the current regulatory stalemate.   
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